خوازيق البلد: ثانيهم (بعد الحبيب الإمام), محمد أحمد محجوب

مازن سخاروف

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#1
طبعا يوجد ناس أدمغتهم لا تعرف ولا تعترف بمراجعات (حقيقية طبعا) أو إعادة تحقيق في تاريخنا المدسوس عليه وفيه.

وهناك كتيبة تمجيد الأشخاص (بحق وبغير حق إلى يوم الدين). أمثال هؤلاء من اعتاد إضافة لام التعريف إلى محجوب للتفخيم, (والتعريف ليس من أصل الإسم), فيصبح المحجوب.

وهو في اعتبارنا أحد الخوازيق الكبار من كتيبة تزوير التاريخ, كما التآمر. والبينة علينا في هذا البوست وفي غيره.

بدأنا بـ (الحبيب) الإمام الصادق المهدي, عميل الوكالة المركزية والحمدلله تم وضع المذكور في فتيل (هدية إلى ناس الإمام رقم صعب لا يمكن تجاوزه. يرجى من هؤلاء توجيه المخاطبة والتشريف إلى رئيس محطة السي آي إيه في الخرطوم في تاريخه)



والآن:

أيها السادة, أقدم لكم, الخازوق محمد أحمد محجوب
 

مازن سخاروف

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#2
في هذا البوست, (خازوقية) محمد أحمد محجوب نفصلها من خلال دوره السيئ (تدليس, تآمر وخيانة, أو كل ما سبق) في ثلاث وقائع تاريخية تحديدا


الأول, أحداث مارس 1954


الثاني, روايته للوقائع فيما يختص بإنقلاب 19 يوليو 1971
وكلمته (للتاريخ) بذلك الشأن


وثالثة الأثافي, خيانة (بالمعنى القاتل للكلمة) من سدة الحكم فيما يختص بالقضية الفلسطينية في حرب النكسة وما تلاها. خيانة وأجندة مزدوجة لدرجة قف تأمل





ذكرت القضية الفلسطينية دون أقواس لأنها في تلك الفترة كانت القضية


على هامش البوست (أو ربما من عمق الموضوع) سأتطرق كذلك إلى شخصية محمد أحمد محجوب, كمثقف وسياسي وشخصية (وطنية) .. وهيا بنا.
 

مازن سخاروف

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#3
نبتدئ مرافعتها من الآخر؛ بـ (ثالثتهن) في إزدواجية محمد أحمد محجوب .. وهي إظهاره لخلاف ما يبطن وخيانته للقضية الفلسطينية التي كانت تعتبر أكبر قضية في ذلك الوقت

نبدأ بمواقف وأقوال محمد أحمد محجوب المناصرة والمنحازة للقضية الفلسطينية والعربية ومرجعنا في ذلك كتابه


Democracy on Trial: Reflections on Arab and African Politics

وهو طبعا النص الأصلي بالإنجليزية, وقد ترجم فيها بعد إلى العربية بعنوان, الديمقراطية في الميزان الذي يعرفه الكل من قبيلة المثقفين ويعتبره البعض نصا مبجلا, وربما حتى مقدسا في تاريخ السياسة السودانية الحديثة.
 

مازن سخاروف

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#7
فيما يلي سأقتبس بإسهاب من كتاب محمد أحمد محجوب, النص الأصلي باللغة الإنجليزية ثم أتبُعه بالترجمة بإذن الله. كي يكون الأمر مرتبا, سأقسم الإقتباسات من الإنجليزية إلى عدة أجزاء, وأورد أرقام الصفحات نهاية كل إقتباس

الجزء الأول
Thus ended the Six-Day War. A war that nobody wanted and for which we the Arab countries were not prepared; a war that was suddenly precipitated by President Nasser, and ended so quickly with disastrous losses for the Arabs. One-fifth of the total area of Egypt was occupied by Israel and the Suez Canal was closed. The West Bank of the Jordan, including Jerusalem, was lost by the Arabs; Syria ‘s Golan Heights were occupied by the enemy. Inevitably the military defeat and the loss of so many Arab lives were aggravated by the widespread disruption caused, and the economic disaster which came in the wake of the lost war.
Shooting ceased on the battlefields, but the war of words was to go on endlessly at the conference tables.
There were two major developments. In New York, Russia demanded a special session of the UN General Assembly. In the Middle East, a meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers was called, to take place in Kuwait. I led the Sudanese delegation to this meeting which opened on a luxurious palace on June 17. Sheikh Sabah al Ahmed al Jaber, the Kuwait Foreign Minister took the Chair.
[..]
I asked for the floor. We had brought for us a comprehensive proposal for a unified Arab stand and when the Sheikh gave me permission to speak, I presented it to the meeting. We called for genuine unity among Arab states and went on:
a) The Sudan recommends that all military, economic and political potentialities of the Arab countries should be co-ordinated , consolidated and directed towards the attainment of victory.
b) Arab solidarity, which should be the basis for unified Arab effort, must rest upon the acceptance by all Arab states of the principle of co-existence amongst all the diverse systems now prevalent, without the attempt by any country to intervene in the affairs of another;
[...]
e) Arab foreign policy should be unified within the principle of ‘enmity towards enemies of Arabs and friendships to our friends’;
f) Oil-producing countries should continue not pumping oil, irrespective of the cost, or consequence;
g) It should be mandatory for all other Arab states to undertake similar retaliatory measures against the economic interests of the United States of America and Britain in their respective contries
[..]
Democracy on Trial, pp.121-22​
 

مازن سخاروف

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#9
part 2

A general debate on the Sudanese proposal followed; and it was a tough debate
[..]​


The debate moved on to another point. The extremist platform kept pushing for the severance of diplomatic relations with the USA and Britain (when the Six-Day War broke out, some Arab states broke off relations, others did not) and the cutting-off of oil supplies to any country which supported Israel. There was no response to the former proposal, but on the latter, a more positive outlook was evident.​


The Kuwait meeting was suspended without any decision or communiqué. Since we were all leaving next morning to attend an Emergency Session of the UN General Assembly we agreed to continue our deliberations in New York.​


[..]​


In New York, we immediately held a meeting of the Arab League States to plan our strategy at the Emergency Session. I was appointed by the Arab Foreign Ministers as their spokesman.​


pp.122-23, ibid
 

مازن سخاروف

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#11
نواصل الإقتباس, الجزء الثالث
[part 3]


Israel found diplomatic support from the Western states, led by the United States. It was so different from the time of the Suez War in 1956 [..] This time the USA spared no effort, both within the Security council and outside it, in support of Israel’s position.


The Soviet Union called for an Emergency Session of the General Assembly for a resolution ordering the Israeli forces to pull out from the occupied territories. Washington set out to counter the Soviet intention; but it was obvious that, under American pressure, there would be sufficient support for Israel (by Latin American and some African countries) to prevent a two-thirds majority needed for a successful resolution, the US did not oppose the convening of a General Assembly.


This began on July 17 [June 17, Mahjoub misspoke, M.S] and almost immediately ran into a stalemate. Mr. Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, submitting a resolution calling for the condemnation of Israel as the aggressor and for an immediate withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. The resolution also ordered Israel to make good all losses suffered by the Arabs as a result of its aggression.


The USA opposed the Soviet move with a counter-resolution proposing that the dispute between Israel and Arab states be resolved by direct negotiation between parties, assisted by a mediator acceptable to both sides; it asked the Arabs to recognise Israel with her present borders, respect her sovereignty over her territories and guarantee free passage to Israeli shipping through the waterways of Suez and Aqaba.


.p.124, ibid​
 

مازن سخاروف

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#12
نواصل الإقتباس, الجزء الرابع


[part 4]

While the UN Session was in progress, the Arab Foreign Ministers continued the conference that we started in Kuwait. As it became increasingly obvious that little if any concrete moves would come of the UN debates, we turned to the possibility of holding another Arab Summit, this time in Khartoum


[..]


While these meetings were going on in New York, President Nasser, Algeria’s President Boumedienne, Iraq’s President Abdul Rahman Arif and the Sudan’s President Azhari met in Cairo on July 12 and were joined a day later by President Atasi of Syria.


When I received news of this ‘little Arab Summit’, I cabled President Nasser asking him to keep the meeting going until I could get to Cairo. I then left with my delegation for the Egyptian capital. It turned out to be a fascinating conference.
We arrived in Cairo in the early hours of Sunday, July 16 [..] I gave an extensive survey of everything that had taken place at the UN, adding my own political analysis of the situation. The need now, I emphasised, was for a full Arab Summit and I spelled out the reasons which had lead to the Sudanese President to offer Khartoum as the site for such a meeting. It did not take long for the meeting to be convinced that there was no hope of getting a political solution through the United Nations. We Arabs were left with but one choice –long-range military action, preparation for such action and for striking a decisive blow when the time came.


The Arab states meanwhile should intensify their political pressure through the following: stopping oil supplies to friends of Israel; withdrawal of deposits and reserves from Western banks; severance of diplomatic relations with all countries that assisted the enemy; tightening of economic sanctions against Israel; settlement of the Yemen question; and adoption of a joint policy towards Palestine.​


.pp.128-130, ibid
 

مازن سخاروف

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#13
إنتهت الإقتباسات عن النص الإنجليزي الأصل لكتاب الديمقراطية في الميزان, حيث توضح الأجزاء الأربعة من الإقتباسات خلفية الوقائع لمواقف محمد أحمد محجوب المناصرة للقضية الفلسطينية. سنقدم لاحقا جزء أخيرا كذلك بالإنجليزية عن ذات المصدر بصدد مؤتمر الخرطوم الشهير ولاءاته الثلاث, لا مفاوضات, لا صلح ولا اعتراف بإسرائيل. الجزء الأخير سيقدم كذلك الخلاصة والإستنتاجات لمواقف المحجوب التي تظهر الإنحياز للقضية الفلسطينية وللأطراف العربية, سواءً من يقف منها على جبهة الحرب المباشرة مع إسرائيل, أي مصر, سوريا والأردن, أو تلك المتبنية للموقف والقضية, أي كلنا في الهم شرق أمما وحكومات. وسيعقب الجزء الأخير بالطبع ترجمته إلى العربية.


فيما يلي سنقدم ترجمتنا العربية للأجزاء الأربعة أعلاه من الإقتباسات.
 
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